Abstract-We present a new approach to use adaptive AI and Information Theory to aid the evaluation of game mechanics. Being able to evaluate the core game mechanics early during production is useful to improve the quality of a game, and ultimately, player satisfaction. A current problem with automated game evaluation via AI is to define measurable parameters that correlate to the quality of the game mechanics. We apply the Information Theory based concept of "Relevant Information" to this problem and argue that there is a relation between enjoyment related game-play properties and Relevant Information for an AI playing the game. We also demonstrate, with a simple game implementation, a.) how an adaptive AI can be used to approximate the Relevant Information, b.) how those measurable numerical values relate to certain game design flaws c.) how this knowledge can be used to improve the game.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Motivation
The development of commercial, state of the art, computer games has become a large financial enterprise; involving many people and a large, upfront investment of money. This necessitates project management techniques, such as risk analysis and quality control, considering all components of a game. But while certain aspects, such as graphic quality or code stability, are somewhat straightforward to test, the evaluation of the actual "game mechanics" of a computer game involves several problems.
Not only is it difficult to define what makes game mechanics good, but also the common way of testing, using several human play testers, is cost intensive, slow, and mingles the quality assessment of the game mechanics with the quality assessment of several other aspects of the game. Furthermore, play testing requires the game to have passed through most of its initial development stages beforehand.
B. Related Work
An alternative is the use of an adaptive AI that plays and evaluates the game. Existing research offers a range of adaptive AI approaches, such as genetic algorithms [1] , particle swarm optimization [2] , reinforcement learning [3] and neural networks [4] , [5] , all aimed to create high performing AIs for games. But the problem for AI in game design, as Yannakakis [6] points out, is not to create a good AI, but one that is enjoyable to play against, and one that can be used to improve the game itself. AI aided game balancing [7] , [8] is a good step towards automated game improvement. A more general approach would be to have an AI play the game and then evaluate how much "fun the AI had". One approach that tries to approximate fun through numerical data based on information theory [9] is the application of the theory of Artificial Curiosity. A more empirical way to approach the fun a player has would be to model an AI after actual neurological and physiological data, to simulate the emotions of a real player [10] .
In any case, an AI can be used to serve as a player, and an adaptive AI could approximate a player learning a game and improving its skills. In [11] three AI paradigms, adapting via genetic algorithm, were used to play a turn base strategy game, and their games were then analysed to find flaws in the game mechanics, such as exploits. The constraining factor in this approach was the necessity for a human agent look at the games played and determine if certain flaws were present.
C. Overview
In this paper we use the information theory [12] based concept of "Relevant Information" [13] , [14] to games to define numerical parameters that can be measured without human interaction. First, we will give a short introduction to Information Theory, explain "Mutual Information" and how to apply it to games to calculate their Relevant Information. Then we argue that Relevant Information is a numerical value that corresponds to enjoyment related game-play properties. We will then demonstrate, for a simple, turn based, strategy game, how Relevant Information can be approximated by gathering statistical data from an adaptive, genetic algorithm driven, neural network. This data is then used through several scenarios to detect game play flaws, and adapt the game mechanics.
II. INFORMATION THEORY
Information Theory [12] , [15] can be used to study the properties of random variables. If a random variable X can assume the states x ∈ χ, and P (X = x) is the probability for X to assume the specific state x, we can define a measure H(X) called entropy as:
This is can be described as the uncertainty about the outcome of X, or the average expected surprise, or the information gained if one was to observe the state of X, without having prior knowledge about X. The entropy has a number of interesting properties. Among others, the a priori uncertainty (i.e. entropy) is larger if the outcomes are more evenly distributed than if the outcomes are more concentrated on a particular value. In other words, if some values are more probable to occur than others then our overall uncertainty is reduced, but we would also gain less information if we actually observe X.
Consider two jointly distributed random variables, X and Y , with y ∈ Ψ; then we can calculate the conditional entropy of X given a particular outcome Y = y as:
This can also be generalized to the entropy of X, given Y in general, averaged over all possible outcomes of Y :
This is the entropy of X that remains if Y is known. We now have H(X), the entropy of X before Y is known, and H(X|Y ), the entropy of X after we learn the state of Y . Their difference is the amount of information we can learn about X by knowing Y . Subtracting one from the other, we get a value called mutual information:
The mutual information is symmetrical [15] and measures, in bits, the amount of information one random variable contains about another (and vice versa, by symmetry). This quantity will be of central importance in the following argument.
A. Game Player Interaction Model
In order to apply Information Theory to a specific game we model the interaction between the game and the player with a "Causal Bayesian Network" [16] , as seen in Fig. 1 .
Since we are dealing with a computer game it should be no problem to assign discrete values to the parameters that describe the current state of the game. The causal Bayesian network consists of three random variables. S and A represent the user interface. A corresponds to the action the player chooses, its state space are the available actions for the player. S corresponds to the sensor input of the player. The state s of S is the state of the game world as shown to the player. R represents the complete set of parameters that is necessary to describe the game's internal state. Those values can be constructed by first creating simple random variable for different sensors or aspects of the environment, and then combining them into a single variable, similar to how several letters or bits can be combined to a word.
The arrows denote the causal relations between those nodes as defined in [16] . This indicates that everything that influences a state of a variable either has a arrow pointing to that variable, or does so through another variable. The game thereby is fully defined by A, S, R, the causal relations from A to R and from R to S. In addition we assume that there is a function that assigns a performance value (like winning or losing, or points) to R. The player, or the agent playing the game, determines the conditional probability P (A|S), thereby determining with what probability a certain action is chosen, given a specific sensor input. This probablity P (A|S) will be called a strategy.
To simplify the scenario we also assume that we deal with a game of perfect information, where the state of the world is fully accessible the player. This means that the sensor state S and the state of the world R can be treated as identical, since they contain the same information. Also, it makes it unnecessary for the agent to have any kind of memory.
B. Relevant Information
Relevant Information (RI) is a formalism based on mutual information. It measures how much information an agent needs to obtain from the environment to determine its optimal strategy. We will introduce its definition in a form well suited to the context of a computer game. A more general definition can be found in [13] .
Per definition, the game has a function that determines the performance of the player with regard to the state of the game R. This means there exists one, or several strategies P (A|S) that result in the highest expected performance. We will call those strategies the optimal strategies.
Relevant Information is defined as the (minimal) amount of information the agent needs to acquire to be able to realise one of those optimal strategies. For any given strategy the amount of information that A contains about R can be measured with I(A; R). As argued in [16] , such a correlation means that one state is causing the other, and given the diagram in Fig. 2 , this can only happen via S, the sensors. Therefore, S also needs to contain the information, and it follows that I(A; R) is a reasonable measurement for the obtained information, for any given strategy.
If we assume that the sensor state and the state of the environment are identical and there is no memory then I(A; S) can be used as well. RI now is the minimal amount of information an agent needs to act optimally, so it is defined Fig. 2 . This figure depicts, for different game worlds, the relation between action and utility, given a certain world state. The numbers correspond to a performance value. In world 1 the RI can be computed as two bits that encode the game state. The optimal strategy chooses a different action for every state of the world; therefore it has to obtain two bits of information to determine what state the world is in. World 2 is an example of a scenario where there is no RI. The actions of the agent do not matter, and it needs to know nothing to make the best choice. World 4 has a RI of only 1 bit. One optimal strategy here would still be to choose a different action for every state, but there is also another strategy that just relies on finding out if the world is in the first two or last two states. Since we look for the minimum mutual information across all strategies, the agent only needs to obtain one bit. World 3 demonstrates that a suboptimal performance level can be reached with less RI. Using the same strategy as in World 4, the agents obtains an average performance of 1.5, but if the agents would obtain two bits of information he could achieve an average performance of two.
as the minimal mutual information over all optimal strategies. In other words, the RI for the system is defined as the mutual information of the optimal strategy with the lowest mutual information. To make this a bit more clear, we present several expmaples in Fig. 2 : By extension, it is also possible to calculate the amount of information needed to obtain a certain suboptimal performance level, by calculating the minimum RI of all strategies that reach at least that level of expected performance [14] . Since the strategy with the minimal mutual information is chosen from a set of strategies that gets smaller as performance increases, it follows that an increase in the performance level increases the RI or keeps it at least the same. So the function that relates RI and performance is monotonously increasing. It should also be clear, that this function is defined for a given game mechanic and does not actually depend on the strategy chosen by the player, but on the strategy that has the lowest mutual information. Therefore, RI is a property of the game mechanic itself.
III. RELEVANT INFORMATION AND PLAYER SATISFACTION
In this chapter we argue how RI corresponds with game mechanical properties that foster or hinder enjoyment. Since it is questionable if fun can be measured by some mathematical formalism, we are focussing on measurable factors that hinder fun in games and should therefore be avoided. Those factors are mainly taken from literature, such as [17] , [18] , or determined by common sense. Some of them might be debatable, but this is beyond the scope of this paper, as is a psychological or sociological evaluation of those factors and their relation to game play fun.
What we want to demonstrate instead is that RI offers some measurable values that relate to properties in game mechanics that should be avoided. The first data point we want to discuss in this context is the actual RI, the minimal amount of mutual information over the set of optimal strategies.
A. Inferior Choices
One possible design flaw is to offer the player a choice of actions where one actions is never a good choice, independent of the circumstances, since there is always another better option. In this case that action is never played with an optimal strategy. The Mutual information between R and A can alternatively be expressed in those two ways:
Therefore, its value has an upper bound given by H(A) and H(R), because the conditional entropy H(A|R) or H(R|A) is always positive. If there are n different options of actions in A, then the maximum entropy of A, given that all actions are chosen with the same frequency, is:
If we now eliminate one option for A, the maximum entropy is reduced to log( 1 n−1 ). So, for every inferior choice in A the maximum RI is becomes more limited. Therefore, an increasing presence of inferior choices should be detectable by a decrease in the value of RI.
B. Dominant Strategies
Related to the inferior choices problem is another, more severe, flaw, the existence of a dominant strategy. By dominant strategy we mean a strategy or action that is always better than all other options, independent of the circumstances, such as the actions of other players, or changes in the environment. In those scenarios an optimal agent's strategy will always choose the same actions, regardless of the agent's sensor input. Such a scenario is also undesirable, because once the player finds this strategy he is forced to play it continuously.
An example of this scenario is the World 6 in Fig. 2 . Here the player would always play action 1. The amount of information one would need to acquire about the environment is 0, so the RI is also 0. If we only look at single actions this also follows mathematically from the argument in the last section. If the player only chooses one action, no matter what the environment, then H(A), the entropy of A is 0, leading also to no mutual information.
But to detect this flaw, and differentiate it from the flaw described in the next section, we need to take an additional data point into account, the performance level of the random strategy. This strategy chooses its actions at random, with an equal chance for every action to be picked, disregarding any sensor input. This strategy's actions have obviously no mutual information with the environment. The performance level of this strategy indicates how much utility a player can get "for free", by acting without any thought or regard of the environment.
If there is now a dominant strategy in the game, then the player can find this strategy, and we can measure a strategy that has the same amount of relevant information (none), but should have a higher performance level than random. If this is not the case, then we are dealing with the next flaw.
C. Irrelevant Actions
A different flaw is to design a game mechanic where the agent's effort has no impact on the outcome of the game. Apart from the question if this is a game at all then, we assume that this is not desirable. Also, while it is doubtful that such a scenario is designed by a human designer by choice, it is possible in a complex game world that such a pathological case sneaks in. Also, if we want to evolve game mechanics, it might be possible that the computer creates a game like we see in World 2 or 5 in Fig. 2 .
World 2 describes the payoff of a scenario where neither the agent's action nor the states of the environment matter. All strategies have the same payoff, and therefore, the RI is 0, because the strategy that plays random is also optimal. World 5 has a payoff that depends only on the world state, so the random strategy again is one of the optimal strategies, and the RI for all those cases is 0.
To differentiate between this case, and a dominant strategy we just have to look if there is an actual spread in the performance levels of the strategies that is not explained by random noise. If the random strategy plays as good as all other strategies, than there seems to be nothing to do for the player, its actions are irrelevant. If there is actually a visible difference between bad and good strategies, but they are still having no RI, then we are dealing with a dominant strategy.
D. Optimal Case
The optimal case, in this context a case where the previously discussed flaws are absent, would be a game designed in a way that:
1) The player uses all possible options, in similar frequency 2) The decision of the player have an impact on the world 3) The optimal decision depends on the different states of the environment It seems that this case should have a high degree of RI for the best strategy. Furthermore, the performance for the random strategy should be low, and the increase in performance should lead to an increase in RI.
E. Partitioning of the World Space
Additionally, all of the considerations discussed in the last part can also be applied to a part of the world. Thereby, it not only possible to evaluate a subset of the game mechanics, rather than the whole. Instead of calculating the mutual information between A and S, we can observe a subset of S, called S * , and calculate I(A; S * ). This makes it possible to answer the question, whether a certain part (S * ) of the visible world (the agent's sensor input) contains information relevant to the player. If this is not the case, then the display of that part of the game world to the player might be unnecessary or confusing. Alternatively, it might be possible that S * is supposed to have an impact on the players decision, in which case one could pinpoint where the game mechanics have to be altered to make S * relevant. This could be helpful in the design of user interfaces.
Furthermore, for any part of the game world R, called R * we can use mutual information to determine if that part of the game world is having an actual impact on the game's outcome; meaning that there is mutual information between R * and a random variable encoding if a game is lost or won. If there is no mutual information then it follows that there is no statistical dependence. If there is also no RI in R * , meaning that R * is not helpful for the player in determining what action to chose, then it becomes questionable how that part of the world relates with the game mechanics at all.
Considering the other cases where there is a relation between R * and the game's outcome we can again identify several cases. If R * is not perceivable by the player, then we are introducing a hidden random factor into the game. If R * is actually visible to the player, but yields no RI, then an optimal strategy does not need to take R * into account. This means, R * is a relevant factor in the game world that we can do nothing about. If this is desirable or not is a design question (it could be information about how close the player is to winning the game). But an information theoretic analysis allows us to identify those factors, nonetheless.
IV. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION
To test our hypothesis we implemented a simple, turn based tactics game where the player controls several armies and has to make the decision what actions those armies are going to take. We will demonstrate how neural network AIs, adapted to the game via genetic algorithm, are used to approximate the actual relation between RI and performance, and how this information can then be used to improve the game mechanics. We present several consecutive scenarios where the results of the RI based analysis of the last scenario were used to improve the game mechanics or the current scenario.
A. Game Mechanics
Our test-bed is a simple, turn based, two player tactics game; a very simplified version of the battles in the Heroes of Might & Magic series. Both players start with three stacks containing three creatures each. The goal for both is to kill the opponent's stacks by attacking them with their own stacks. The only decision the players have to make is to decide what action their stacks are going to take when it is their turn to act. The four options are to either attack one of the three opposing stacks or to wait.
All creatures start with the same attributes for attack damage and hitpoints. Additionally we removed the spatial component so stacks can attack each stack of the enemy, regardless of position. Every stack gets to act once per round, the order is random.
If a stack attacks another, the damage dealt is calculated by multiplying the hitpoints of all remaining creatures in the stack and their attack damage. There is a random element in the attack damage, so while each creature has a certain damage range; the actual damage done varies. The damage is then subtracted from the hitpoints of the first enemy creature. If the hitpoints of a creature reach zero the number of creatures in the stack is decreased, and the remaining damage is subtracted from the next creature. If the number of creatures in a stack reaches zero, the stack dies and is removed/ignored until the game ends.
The AI input is determined as follows: We uses two bits to encode the stack's topmost creature's health and two bits for the actual number of creatures in a stack. An additional bit was used to determine if the stack has the ability to retaliate in the current round. So overall we used five bits to encode a stack's current state. Two players with three stacks each make six stacks in the game which makes the signature of each game state an array of thirty bits. So the neural network, as seen in Fig. 3 has thirty input nodes, each input node receives one bit of the sensor data as a float value of either 1.0 or 0.0. The network has four output nodes, each associated with a different action the AI can take. Which action the AI decides to use is then determined at random, where the proportion of the value of a certain node would correspond to the probability of that action being chosen. For example, if node one had the value 1.0 and the three other nodes had the value of 0.5, then action one would be chosen with a probability of 40% and the other actions would be chosen with a probability of 20% each.
B. Approximation via Genetic Algorithm
Calculating the actual RI for each performance level would make it necessary to look at all possible strategies. But this approach becomes quickly unfeasible, once the complexity of a game grows. Our alternative suggestion is to use a genetic algorithm to select a subsection of all strategies, those adapted to be of high performance and low mutual information. We then record the mutual information and performance of those strategies and use those to approximate the actual RI.
Note that, since the computation of mutual information requires the joint probability of both variables, it is not sufficient to only look at a strategy P (A|S) to compute I(A; S); it is also necessary to get data about the distribution of P (S). But this is not a problem in a game scenario, where the AI playing the game can be used to create an actual distribution of P (S).
The genome of our genetic algorithm is the collected internal weights of the neural network. We first create 20 genomes with random values. We then create the associated neural networks that play the game for 1000 games against an opponent that picks random actions. As a next step, for each strategy, we measure both the performance, as the fraction of games won, and the mutual information for the recorded joint distribution of sensor states and chosen actions for those games. Note that each game consists of several pairs of sensor inputs and taken actions.
We then evaluate the genomes with a fitness function that favours high performance and low mutual information, weighted with a variable weighting factor λ. Both values, performance and mutual information are normed to values between 1.0 and 0. For the performance we divide the number of victorious games by the number of played games. For the mutual information we divide the results by the maximum entropy of the actions, in our case 2. The mutual information is then subtracted from 1.0, since we want to minimise it. We usually use the values of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 for λ, where λ = 0.0 means that only mutual information matters, and λ = 1.0 means that only performance is taken into account. The most fit genomes are procreated and we repeat this process until we exhaust a set amount of generations, usually 200.
We measure the relation between performance and mutual information for all genomes in all generations and the result is a graph as seen in Fig. 4,5,6 ,7. Every data point in the graph is a strategy, the values indicate its performance and its mutual information. The actual graph for the RI would be a line, as in Fig. 4 , that all data points are either on or above, since it is possible for a strategy to have higher mutual information, but not lower. The two factors in our fitness function are used to evolve the strategies towards higher performance, and lower mutual information, thereby moving the resulting strategies closer to this actual graph. Note that the graph is not an average of the strategies we are looking at, but a lower bound. Therefore, it is possible to take the results of several evolutionary runs and combine them all into the same graph. This can only improve the approximation. Also, since the mutual information is a function defined by the game mechanics, it is possible to vary λ and evolve strategies that are more optimized towards performance or mutual information reduction, and still combine them in the same graph. Indeed, our experience suggests that this is advised to get a good selection of strategies.
C. Technical Problems 1) Deterministic Strategy:
One problem in approximating the actual RI of a game is the use of deterministic strategies. A classical neural network usually picks one action based on its inputs, and normally it would always choose the same action for the same input. This automatically limits the strategies P (A|S) to those where H(A|S) = 0 , since the action is determined by the sensor inputs. This leads to the mutual information being calculated as:
Since we are looking for the strategy with the least amount of mutual information, limiting us to deterministic strategies seems to hinder a good approximation. Strategies that take a random decision in those circumstances where it does not matter are not included and therefore the overall mutual information is pushed upwards.
One solution is to modify the way the neural network chooses the actions. Instead of picking the actions whose nodes got the highest values, we now associate the values of the end nodes with the probability for that action to be picked. This allows the neural network to realise random strategies; strategies that should be favoured if they have the same performance, but lower mutual information. V. SCENARIOS
A. Case 1, no player effect
In our initial scenario both sides had the same creatures and there was no ability to retaliate. The player had the option to attack the stacks in position one, two or three, and if he would try to attack a stack that was dead, the game would redirect his attack to the next stack alive. Waiting was not a possible option. Several evolutions of our adaptive AI yielded the results seen in Fig. 5 .
Two things can be observed here. Firstly, there is no real difference in performance levels between the different strategies, they all seem to be very close to zero. So it seems that the players actions have no real impact on the outcome of the game. The small variation in performance values is likely due to the random element in damage calculation that allows the player to win in rare cases. The graphs performance scale is actually only reaching from 0.0 to 0.025, otherwise, if the scale would go up to 1.0, the variations would be nearly invisible on the graph.
Note that the performance is near zero, so the player nearly never wins. This is slightly surprising, since we first thought that the player should have an fair chance against the opponent AI, but then we realised with closer examination, that the opponent always seems to go first.
The second thing we observe is that the RI for all the performance levels up to ca. 0.011 is zero, since there is always at least one strategy that does not use any information. Also, for the other strategies that go above that value the increase in RI is quite low.
Comparing that to our earlier theories we seem to be dealing with a case where the players actions are irrelevant, and a closer look at our current game mechanics supports this analysis. All actions are attacks, deal similar damage, always hit a valuable target, and even reduce the opponents ability to deal damage in a similar way. So no matter what the player decides, the actions has a similar payoff. So no matter what the player decides, it does not seem to change its game performance.
B. Case 2, dominant strategy
In our second case we modify the game mechanics so the player has an impact on the game. We introduce the retaliate mechanics, and now each stack can retaliate once per game round. We also introduce the option for a stack to wait and do nothing for one round. Now the player has an impact on the game. A good strategy will have to incorporate that waiting is a bad choice, since it never does anything, and it should also aim to attack an enemy stack that has already retaliated to minimise the damage done in return.
Looking at Fig. 6 we can see that there now are several strategies with better performances than random, and we see several strategies that are able to win the game more than 60 percent of the time even though the game still lets the opponent start first. But even for those relatively high performance levels the amount of RI seems to be zero, since there are strategies that reach that performance, but have no mutual information.
A closer look at the actual decision of the AIs shows that one good strategy is to always attack stack 1. This avoids using wait, it focusses all attacks on the same target to avoid retaliation, and if the first stack is dead, the attack will be forwarded to the next stack. This, arguably, seems to even be an optimal strategy. On the downside, this also seems to be what we earlier identified as a dominant strategy. A strategy, that given the current game mechanics, always seems to be optimal, no matter what the actual state of the world is. So there is no need for the player to actually look at the game world to make a decision. This works well with our predictions, since the graph of the mutual information would indicate this as well. As discussed, we get strategies that improve well above the performance level of the random strategies but still keep a mutual information of zero. This graph also shows how the different weights in the fitness function push the AIs along different paths in the two dimensional projection (to mutual information and performance) of the solution space. The adaptation towards minimal mutual information (λ = 0.0) moves quickly towards the random strategies and then ends up in a cluster around zero performance and zero mutual information. The strategies that maximise performance (λ = 1.0) don't move towards the lower mutual information, but their cluster pushes to the right to explore strategies with higher performance. Finally, the strategies that balance both constraints (λ = 0.5) develop good strategies that also use no mutual information.
C. Case 3, positive Relevant Information
We further modify the game so it is necessary for a good strategy to acquire information about the game world. Now retaliate is stronger, and it will only be activated if a stack has waited in the last turn. Since the AI chooses strategies at random this should lead to some opponents randomly being able to retaliate. A good strategy should avoid those stacks. Furthermore, we also stop the forwarding of attack orders. So, if an AI now attacks a stack that is dead its attack will have no effect. Thus, the information of whether a stack has remaining creatures should become relevant.
Looking at the graph in Fig. 7 we can see that our game play modifications have lead to a measurable change in the RI. It seems possible for the AI to actually develop good strategies, some of them win in more than 70 percent of the cases, but for all the strategies that go beyond a performance of 10 percent there seems to be at least a certain amount of information those strategies need to pick up. Also, the better the strategies get the more information they seem to use. This indicates, that a higher performance level also needs a better analysis of the different factors of the game world. All in all, this graph does not indicate any of the flaws we discussed earlier.
VI. DISCUSSION
The analysis of the different cases seems to support our initial theory about how to relate measurements from information theory with enjoyment related game parameters. If the properties discussed, such as inferior choices and dominant strategies, are actually undesirable for a game or not, is a discussion that is out of the scope of this work, but we think that having a implementable solution to detect them might be useful, nonetheless.
We also demonstrated a technique to approximate RI. Here we should note that there exist better ways to determine the actual RI, as discussed in [14] , but we believe those are more complicated in application, and require detailed knowledge of the system they are studying, while the genetic algorithm approach can treat the studied game as a black box.
All in all, it seems that this approach is something that can be implemented with the techniques described, and can be used, if for nothing else, as an additional mean to evaluate the quality of game rules, especially those of strategic decision making games. The analysis of RI could of course also be extended to different kinds of games, since it would also make sense to check if a player actually needs to react to the environment in an ego shooter, but the modelling of such games in terms of random variables would require some additional consideration. Turning the input and output of the game into discrete state is usually not difficult, since everything is implemented on a computer, and ultimately made of bits and bytes, but the enormous increase in state space can make the calculation of the mutual information unfeasible.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The discussed results are only a first step towards a fully automated evaluation of game mechanics. A closer look at how the RI is distributed inside the game world could yield additional information about what aspects of the game should be exposed to the player. Also, there are other information theoretic measures, such as "Empowerment", that could be used to take a context independent look at games. Empowerment seems to be particularly interesting here, because it basically measures how much impact the actions of a player have on the world he can perceive.
Once more robust evaluation mechanics are found an interesting next step would be to automate both, the design and the evaluation processes of a game. Given that one has a formalised language that expresses game mechanics, it would be possible to make a game itself the subject of a genetic algorithm. The genomes would represent different game mechanics, which would then be evaluated in turn by an adaptive AI, itself driven by an genetic algorithm.
Another, more practical, approach would be to apply a clustering technique to the different RI graphs to predict what kind of game play flaw a certain game mechanic has. As we discussed in this paper, different flaws e.g. inferior choices or dominant strategies generate different patterns in these diagrams.
